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Does lowering the bar help? Results from a natural experiment in high-stakes testing 
in Dutch primary education*
In many countries, high-stakes tests play an important role in the allocation of pupils to 
prestigious tracks or schools in secondary education or students to prestigious programs 
or colleges in tertiary education. It is not clear what would happen if the standards for 
these tests were systematically raised or lowered. Would that affect the subsequent 
educational career? This paper exploits a unique natural experiment in the Netherlands 
using the market entrance of two new suppliers of high-stakes tests in primary education. 
In the first year of introduction, these new tests were not yet properly calibrated: For one 
test the standards were too low, while for the other test they were too high, compared 
to the standards of the traditional test that continued to be the main supplier. We use 
high-quality register data and a within-schools-across-cohorts design to model the 
short- and long-term outcomes (i.e., change in teacher advice and actual track three 
years later) for the students that were affected by the new tests. We find evidence for 
short-term effects, but no evidence for long-term effects. This implies that the Dutch 
educational system is sufficiently flexible to allocate pupils to the appropriate track, 
even if a high-stakes test advice does not recommend the right track. At the same time, 
it also implies that lowering the bar is not a simple way to increase the share of students 
going to prestigious tracks. 
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In many countries, high-stakes tests play an important role in the allocation of pupils to 
prestigious tracks or schools in secondary education or students to prestigious programs or 
colleges in tertiary education. It is not clear what would happen if the standards for these tests 
were systematically raised for some students and lowered for others. Will the former group 
of students experience a long-term penalty in their study career and will the latter group 
profit? No ethical committee would allow such an experiment to take place because of the 
potential strong adverse effects for those students who were denied allocation to a track that 
would normally fit their potential.  
In this paper, we use a unique natural experiment that sheds light on the effects of 
raising or lowering the standards of a high-stakes test. In the Netherlands, the allocation to 
tracks in secondary education takes place at age 12 (grade 6) and is based on the primary 
school teacher’s advice and the results of a nationwide high-stakes test. Before the test is 
taken, the primary school teachers give a so-called initial advice based on previous 
performance in school. After the high-stakes test results are available, teachers have the 
option to adjust their initial advice and produce a final advice. However, the teachers are only 
allowed to upgrade this advice, not downgrade it.  
Until 2014, the test was not mandatory, although some 90% of the schools made use 
of the so-called Cito-test (as of 2014 renamed into CET-test). In 2014, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sciences passed a new law, making the test mandatory but allowing 
new suppliers of high-stakes tests to enter the market. Two new suppliers entered the market 
at that time: Route 8 and IEP. In the first year of their introduction (2014/2015) only 4% of the 
schools in our dataset switched to one of these new tests, but in the second year (2015/2016) 
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this increased to 23%. All three tests convert the overall score on the test into a so-called track 
recommendation: each range of the score corresponds to a certain track in secondary 
education. We will refer to these converted scores as the test advice. 
In the first years of introduction, the cut-off points for these track recommendations 
were not yet properly calibrated for the new tests, since they had been tested on a small 
sample of pupils in a low-stakes setting. This implied that the cut-off points for the different 
track recommendations were too high in one case and too low in the other case. As teachers 
are only allowed to adjust their advice in an upward direction, the test advices that were 
systematically too high, might result in some pupils getting a final teacher’s advice that is 
higher than expected based on their ‘true’ performance. After 2015/2016 this problem was 
solved as the test suppliers could adjust their cut-off points on the results of the high-stakes 
setting in the previous year. Of course, this problem did not hold for the traditional test (Cito), 
as this test was already calibrated in a high-stakes setting. 
It is important to highlight that schools had no prior knowledge about the bias in the 
standards of the new tests. They acted under the assumption that the cut-off points for the 
track recommendations in the test were like the ones used in the traditional test.1 As such, 
the change to a new test supplier in 2015/2016 is a natural experiment, where pupils in some 
schools received a systematically higher track recommendation compared to what they would 
have received had they taken the traditional test, while pupils in other schools received 
systematically lower track recommendations. In this paper, we compare schools that used the 
traditional test in 2014/2015 and switched to one of the new tests in 2015/2016 with schools 
that continued using the traditional test. We use a multilevel design to model the change 
                                                     




within schools across the two cohorts, to take account of any effect resulting from specific 
schools switching to one of the new suppliers. 
The research questions we aim to answer are the following: 1) To what extent does the 
test advice vary across different types of high-stakes tests for pupils with the same 
performance level? 2) To what extent do these differences affect the final teacher’s advice at 
age 12 (short-term effects)? 3) To what extent do these differences affect pupils’ educational 
position after three years at age 15 (long-term effects)? 4) To what extent does this differ 
between pupils of different socio-economic background?  
We use high-quality register data from the Netherlands Cohort Study on Education 
(Nationaal Cohortonderzoek Onderwijs: NCO; for more information see Haelermans et al., 
2020). This dataset enables us to track all pupils in the Dutch education system and assess 
information about the test results from the different high-stakes test suppliers in the 
Netherlands. This is a huge advantage over survey data, that might suffer from selection bias 
and lack of statistical power.  
The paper is organized as follows. After the theoretical framework (Section 2), we 
describe the Dutch education system and the different tests that were used (Section 3). 
Section 4 describes the data and methods and in Section 5 we present the results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this paper we highlight the role of high-stakes testing in the context of the transition from 
primary to secondary education in an early stratifying system: The Netherlands. In the Dutch 
education system, this transition is based on the advice of the primary school teacher and the 
track recommendation resulting from a national test. As indicated above, the track 
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recommendation from the test (the test advice) can be used by primary school teachers to 
adjust their initial advice, but only in an upward direction: If the test advice is higher than the 
initial advice, the primary school teacher can decide to give a higher final advice, and this 
might in turn result in a higher track placement.  
Let us first concentrate on the first step in this process: The adjustment of the final 
teacher’s advice. This adjustment will not automatically occur for all pupils. Teachers might 
be more willing to revise their initial judgement for pupils from higher social strata that are 
considered to have a more stimulating home environment (Timmermans, De Boer, Amsing, & 
Van der Werf, 2018). Moreover, as both the initial teacher advice and the test advice are 
communicated with the pupils and their parents, this will prompt some process of negotiation. 
If parents are informed that the test advice is higher than the initial teacher advice, they might 
put pressure in adjusting the advice in an upward direction. As Boudon (1974) made clear in 
his classical model on the primary and secondary effects of social stratification, this pressure 
will be higher from parents of the higher social strata. This is caused by differences in the cost 
and benefit analysis that individuals from different social strata make in the educational 
decision process (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997). Parents from higher social strata perceive the 
benefits of following a higher education track as more beneficial and the associated costs as 
lower than parents from lower social strata (Boudon, 1974).  Moreover, according to the 
relative risk aversion mechanism, parents from higher strata try to avoid downward mobility 
for their offspring (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997). Breen, Van de Werfhorst and Jæger (2014) 
extend this rational action theory by explicitly including risk aversion and time discount 
preferences that differ between social strata. For pupils from high-SES families, we therefore 
expect that the initial teacher advice will more often be adjusted, since the parents will 
generally insist on placement in the higher academic tracks (Dumont, Klinge, & Maaz, 2019). 
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For low-SES pupils we might expect that the adjustment in the teacher’s advice will be less 
salient, since their parents are less informed about the possibilities of the educational system 
and therefore less likely to go against the initial teachers’ advice (Forster & Van de Werfhorst, 
2020). This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Pupils who took the more lenient test, will have their initial teacher advice more 
often adjusted than pupils who took the traditional test or the stricter test. 
H2: This will hold more strongly for pupils from high-SES families. 
The first implication of a higher primary school teacher advice might be that these pupils will 
initially be allocated to a higher track in secondary education. This might affect pupils’ 
motivation and learning habits and the expectations of secondary school teachers and 
parents. According to Vygotsky (1978), education should provide challenges that fit pupils’ 
zone of proximal development, to improve their individual capabilities. This relates to the 
‘eighty five percent rule for optimal learning’ of Wilson, Shenhav, Straccia and Cohen (2019: 
1) stating that “in many situations we find that there is a sweet spot in which training is neither 
too easy nor too hard, and where learning progresses most quickly”. Their theory states that 
around eighty-five percent of the challenges should be accurate to lead to the optimal learning 
curve. In the case of placing pupils in tracks that are too easy, this is easy to grasp. This form 
of misallocation might lead to suboptimal learning and result in boredom and counter-
productive learning habits (Vaisey, 2006), although opposite findings have been found as well 
(Elsner & Isphording, 2017).  
For our paper it is more important to look at what happens when pupils are allocated 
into tracks above their ability. Here the theory is not conclusive. One might expect a positive 
effect as it provides pupils with an opportunity to develop their talents. The so-called 
educational self-fulfilling prophecy (Taylor, 1979) states that reinforcing pupil’s belief that 
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they can perform at a certain level will increase their performance. Nevertheless, one can also 
expect negative effects when pupils become overwhelmed with the performance 
requirements of the track and potentially must repeat classes, switch to lower tracks or even 
drop out (Hardy, 2003). We assume that low-SES pupils might suffer more from the negative 
consequences, while high-SES pupils might profit from the positive effects. One of the reasons 
why this last group does not suffer from the negative consequences of placement in a track 
that is above their ‘true’ performance, is that they have access to shadow education to 
compensate the gap between their ability and the required performance in the advised track 
(Elffers, 2018, 2019). We formulate the following hypotheses: 
H3: Pupils who took the more lenient test, are more likely to end up in a higher 
academic track in secondary education than pupils who took the traditional test or the 
stricter test, but this will hold only for pupils from high-SES families. 
 
3. The Dutch Context 
The Dutch Education System 
 
The education system of the Netherlands is a track allocation system, which means that pupils 
make several transitions within their educational trajectory (Figure 1). The first important 
transition is in the sixth grade (at age 12) of primary education, when they are allocated to 
different tracks in secondary education. This transition is based on the teachers’ advice and 
the test advice. Before the test is taken, the primary school teachers give a so-called initial 
advice based on previous performance in school. Then the national test is conducted, and this 
provides a test advice. After the high-stakes test results are available, teachers have the option 
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to adjust their initial advice and produce a final advice. However, the teachers are only allowed 
to upgrade this advice, not downgrade it. 
  
Figure 1. The Dutch educational system and transitions between different tracks 
 
The high-stakes tests 
 
As indicated, the high-stakes tests play an important role in track placement into secondary 
education. They also have long-term implications because access to tertiary education is 
based on the diploma obtained from secondary education. Up to 2014/2015, some 90% of the 
schools in the Netherlands administered the same high-stakes test in the sixth grade, 
Eindtoets Basisonderwijs from supplier Cito, although this was not required. After the new 
law, the high-stakes test at the end of primary education was mandatory, but primary schools 
were allowed to choose between three approved high-stakes test suppliers. Although a 
majority of schools continued using the traditional test, which was renamed in the Centrale 
Eindtoets (CET-test), many schools took this opportunity to switch from the CET-test to one of 
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the two new tests: the Route 8-test from supplier A-VISION and the Eindevaluatie Primair 
Onderwijs (IEP-test) from supplier Bureau ICE.  
There are some differences between the three tests in terms of time and format (for 
more information, see Appendix 1), but all three aim to provide a track recommendation, 
based on the test scores in language and math. As mentioned in the introduction, the CET-test 
has a long tradition, which enabled test developers to calibrate the test annually and develop 
rules to transform the test scores into a track recommendation. The other two tests were new 
and, at the time of introduction, not yet calibrated in a high-stakes setting. This means that 
the cut-off points for different track recommendations could be either too high or too low. 
This is illustrated in Figures 2a, 2b and 2c that show the distribution in track recommendations 
for the schools in 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, separately for schools that did not or did switch 




Figure 2a. Distribution of the test advice for schools that did not switch test supplier 
 
 





Figure 2c. Distribution of the test advice for schools that switched from the CET-test to the IEP-test 
 
 Figure 2a presents the distribution of the test advice of schools that kept using the CET-
test. As expected, the distribution of track recommendations between the two different 
school years is almost the same. There are some differences between the two years, since 
they are based on other pupils and some fluctuation between years is normal (Bolhaar & 
Scheer, 2019). Figure 2b shows the distribution for schools that changed from the CET-test to 
the Route 8-test. The distributions differ strongly between the two years. In 2014/2015, more 
pupils were advised to go to the lowest track (vmbo b) or highest track (vwo), whereas, in 
2015/2016, pupils were more often advised to go to the middle tracks (vmbo k, vmbo gt, and 
havo). The distribution of the Route 8-test is thus more peaked. Figure 2c shows the 
distribution for schools that switched to the IEP-test. The distribution changed noticeably 
between the two years, especially for the highest track. The CET-test of 2014/2015 advised 
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more pupils to go to the lower tracks (vmbo b and vmbo k) while the IEP-test of 2015/2016 
advised more pupils to go to the higher tracks. This confirms that the IEP-test was more lenient 
compared to the CET-test.  
 
4. Data and Methods 
Data 
 
We use data from the NCO dataset (Haelermans et al., 2020). This unique dataset contains 
register data of all pupils in primary and secondary education in the Netherlands from school 
year 2008/2009 onwards and includes pupil-, household- and school-characteristics. We 
selected schools that participated in 2014/2015 in the CET-test and in 2015/2016 in either the 
Route 8-test, the IEP-test or the CET-test. We deleted cases with missing values for any of the 
household- and school-characteristics.2 These selection criteria resulted in an analytical 
sample of 284,427 pupils, 5,511 schools and 10,946 school year * school combinations.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The first dependent variable is whether the results of the high-stakes test led to an adjusted 
teacher advice (dummy 1= yes, 0 = no). Note that the adjustment can only be upward, not 
downwards.  
The second dependent variable is the educational position of the pupil three years 
after completing primary school based on the educational ladder constructed by Bosker & van 
der Velden (1989). This scale has been widely used in Dutch educational research and is an 
easy way to compare different tracks and different grades in one scale (see Figure A1 in 
                                                     
2. Missing data are negligible as we rely on register data.  
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Appendix 2). The variable is an ordered discrete variable. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the educational position after three years for all pupils in 2014/2015 and 
2015/2016.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the educational position of pupils after three years 
 
Independent Variables 
The test advice is based on the score the pupils receive on the different tests. Based on this 
score the test suppliers determine cut-off points determining the range of scores associated 
with a certain track recommendation (for an overview, see Table A2 in Appendix 2). The test 
advice is an ordered discrete variable and has the following values 0 = Vmbo b, 0.5 = Vmbo 
b/k, 1 = Vmbo k, 1.5 = Vmbo k/gt, 2 = Vmbo gt, 2.5 = Vmbo gt/havo, 3 = Havo, 3.5 = Havo/Vwo, 
and 4 = Vwo.3  
The recalculated test advice is based on the test advice and has the same values. It is used 
to estimate the effect of the test advice if the cut-off points in the test would have been the 
same as in the traditional test. To do this, we use the cut-off points for different track 
recommendations based on the percentile rank in the distribution of the CET-test in 
2014/2015 and use the same percentile ranks as cut-off points for the distribution of the 
                                                     
3. Pupils with advice ‘special secondary education’ or a level lower than vmbo b (practical education) were 
omitted from the analyses. They represent only a small percentage of the population and refer mainly to 
pupils with low cognitive skills or disabilities. Pupils with an advice covering three or more adjacent tracks 
were also not included in the analyses. 
Value Educational position N % 
0 Vmbo b (9th grade), equivalent or below 22,207 7.81 
1 Vmbo k (9th grade) or equivalent 43,614 15.33 
2 Vmbo gt (9th grade) or equivalent 81,901 28.80 
3 Havo (9th grade) or equivalent  66,229 23.29 
4 Vwo (9th grade), equivalent or above 70,476 24.78 
 Total 284,427 100.00 
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Route 8-test or IEP-test one year later. This is done separately for the schools that switched 
to the Route 8-test and schools that switched to the IEP-test (results of the distributions 
available upon request). 
 
Individual Variables 
In the analyses, we include the following variables.  
Initial teacher advice and Final teacher advice, both measured as ordered discrete 
variables with the same values as the test advice. The correlation between the initial teacher 
advice and the test advice is r = 0.8 (the overlap between initial teacher’s advice and test’s 
advice is given in Table A3 of Appendix 2).  
The second variable is the Type of test with three categories: CET (reference category), 
Route 8, and IEP.  
Other individual variables relate to the background, such as the Gender of the pupil (boys 
as reference category); Migration status (non-migrant as reference category, first-generation 
migrants and second-generation migrants).  
Finally, parental and household characteristics were added. Father’s and Mother’s 
employment status: employed (reference category), receiving benefits, inactive and 
employment status unknown. Household structure: two-parent or one-parent family. Pupils 
who live without their parents are not included in the analyses. And Household income: low 
household income (lowest 25% as reference category), middle household income (between 
the 25th and 75th percentiles) and high household income (highest 25%). Unfortunately, the 
register data do not contain sufficient information about parent’s educational attainment or 






The School year is either 2014/2015 or 2015/2016. School year 2014/2015 is the reference 
category. This variable is used in the multilevel analyses to nest pupils in school*year 
combinations, and school*year combinations into schools.  
 
School-Level Variables 
Several primary school indicators were included in the model. First, the school’s Denomination 
reflecting the beliefs and vision on which the school operates. In the Netherlands, there are 
more than 40 different denominations. In the analyses, these are combined into four 
categories: public schools (reference group), schools based on (educational, pedagogical or 
societal) philosophies, schools based on religious beliefs and multi-denominational schools. 
Schools with multiple denominations are often based on pedagogical as well as religious 
considerations. Furthermore, the index of Urbanization level of the area in which the primary 
school is located, ranging from very low urbanized areas (< 500 addresses/km2; reference 
group), low urbanized areas (500 – 1000 addresses/km2), medium urbanized areas (1000 – 
1500 addresses/km2), strong urbanized areas (1500 – 2500 addresses/km2) and very strong 
urbanized areas (>= 2500 addresses/km2). In addition, the School size is added to the model. 
School sizes are standardized in the analyses.  
 
Table 2 shows the characteristics used in the analyses separately for Route 8-schools, IEP-
schools and CET-schools (for total sample see Table A1 of Appendix 2). Generally, the 
individual-level variables are quite similar across the three types of schools. This means that 
the student-composition in terms of characteristics such as migration background, household 
15 
 
income, and parental employment status does not differ much between schools that use 
different test suppliers. However, when we look at school characteristics, we do find some 
relevant (and statistically significant) differences. For example, Route 8-schools and IEP-
schools are located more often in less urbanized areas compared to CET-schools. Looking at 
the school denomination, we observe that IEP-schools and Route 8-schools are more often 
public schools, compared to CET-schools.  
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Table 2. Descriptives for Route 8, IEP and CET, respectively 
 
    CET 2014/2015 - CET 2015/2016 CET 2014/2015 - Route 8 2015/2016 CET 2014/2015 - IEP 2015/2016 
  N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Educational position after 3 years 250,107 2.428 1.230 11,461 2.345 1.236 22,859 2.352 1.231 
Test advice 250,107 2.501 1.299 11,461 2.310 1.239 22,859 2.514 1.221 
Recalculated test advice 250,107 2.501 1.299 11,461 2.390 1.331 22,859 2.356 1.318 
Initial teacher advice 250,107 2.432 1.213 11,461 2.356 1.221 22,859 2.366 1.216 
Adjusted teacher advice (No=Ref.) 250,107 0.053 0.223 11,461 0.042 0.200 22,859 0.071 0.256 
Final teacher advice 250,107 2.472 1.206 11,461 2.389 1.207 22,859 2.420 1.204 
Gender Girls (Boys=ref.) 250,107 0.503 0.500 11,461 0.505 0.500 22,859 0.510 0.500 
Migration background (Non-migrant=ref.) 250,107 0.782 0.413 11,461 0.810 0.392 22,859 0.789 0.408 
 1st generation 250,107 0.020 0.140 11,461 0.021 0.142 22,859 0.021 0.143 
 2nd generation 250,107 0.198 0.399 11,461 0.169 0.375 22,859 0.191 0.393 
Father’s employment status (Employed=ref.) 250,107 0.863 0.344 11,461 0.872 0.334 22,859 0.860 0.347 
 Receives benefit 250,107 0.075 0.263 11,461 0.077 0.266 22,859 0.076 0.264 
 Inactive 250,107 0.016 0.127 11,461 0.013 0.115 22,859 0.017 0.129 
 Missing 250,107 0.046 0.210 11,461 0.038 0.191 22,859 0.047 0.212 
Mother’s employment status (Employed=ref.) 250,107 0.771 0.420 11,461 0.787 0.410 22,859 0.769 0.421 
 Receives benefit 250,107 0.107 0.309 11,461 0.104 0.305 22,859 0.113 0.317 
 Inactive 250,107 0.116 0.321 11,461 0.103 0.304 22,859 0.112 0.315 
 Missing 250,107 0.005 0.073 11,461 0.006 0.078 22,859 0.006 0.079 
Household structure 1 adult (2 adults=ref.) 250,107 0.156 0.363 11,461 0.147 0.354 22,859 0.168 0.374 
Household income (Low=ref.) 250,107 0.252 0.434 11,461 0.245 0.430 22,859 0.267 0.442 
 Middle 250,107 0.490 0.500 11,461 0.513 0.500 22,859 0.493 0.500 
 High 250,107 0.258 0.437 11,461 0.243 0.429 22,859 0.240 0.427 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) 250,107 0.498 0.500 11,461 0.493 0.500 22,859 0.529 0.499 
Denomination (Public schools=ref.) 250,107 0.291 0.454 11,461 0.368 0.482 22,859 0.424 0.494 
 Schools based on philosophies 250,107 0.046 0.209 11,461 0.064 0.244 22,859 0.038 0.190 
 Schools based on religious beliefs 250,107 0.662 0.473 11,461 0.568 0.495 22,859 0.538 0.499 
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 Multi-denominational 250,107 0.001 0.029 11,461 0.000 0.000 22,859 0.001 0.034 
Urbanization (Very low=ref.) 250,107 0.100 0.299 11,461 0.154 0.361 22,859 0.113 0.317 
 Low 250,107 0.235 0.424 11,461 0.341 0.474 22,859 0.258 0.437 
 Medium 250,107 0.212 0.408 11,461 0.159 0.366 22,859 0.236 0.424 
 Strong 250,107 0.280 0.449 11,461 0.222 0.416 22,859 0.249 0.433 
 Very strong 250,107 0.174 0.379 11,461 0.124 0.330 22,859 0.144 0.352 





Methods of Analyses  
 
We use a multilevel design that corrects for the hierarchical clustering of pupils within schools 
and within school*years (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). We apply a three-level structure in which 
we nest pupils in school*year combinations and school*year combinations in schools.  
Our analyses are estimated in three steps. The first model is a multilevel logistic 
regression analyses about the test advice and the adjustment in the final teacher advice.  The 
second model is a multilevel linear regression that includes the test advice and the 
recalculated test advice of the pupils. In the third model, we split the pupils according to their 
household income (low, middle, high) to see whether the results change across the different 
socio-economic groups. We estimate the models using the melogit and mixed (linear) package 




Relation between the Test Advice and the Upward Adjustment in the Final Teacher 
Advice 
First, we analyze whether the test advice had an impact on the final teachers’ advice or rather 
the upward adjustment in that advice. As indicated above, teachers provided an initial advice 
before the high-stakes test. The results of the high-stakes test could be used to change that 
advice, but only in an upward direction. In 2015/2016, approximately 7.0% of our sample had 
their test advice adjusted: 6.8% of the CET-schools, 5.5% of the Route 8-schools, and 10.4% 
of the IEP-schools. This result is in line with what we expected, since the IEP-test gave higher 
track recommendations thus leading to more upward changes. In Table 3, we show the results 
of a logistic regression analysis whether the teacher advice was adjusted. Models 1-3 present 
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the results for the original test advice and Models 4-6 for the recalculated test advice. As the 
effect of changes in the standards of the test directly affect the test advice itself (by offering 
lower or higher track recommendations), the effect of changing to a new test supplier is best 
observed in Models 4-6.  
 
Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression analysis of test advice and recalculated test advice on 
the adjustment of the teacher advice 
    Test advice Recalculated test advice 
    M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Test advice 3.161*** 3.168*** 3.187***    
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)    
Recalculated test 
advice    3.055*** 3.062*** 3.081*** 
     (0.026) (0.025) (0.0126) 
Initial teacher advice -2.968*** -2.973*** -2.999*** -2.932*** -2.938*** -2.964*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)       
 Route 8  -0.023 0.029  -0.622*** -0.576** 
   (0.185) (0.184)  (0.184) (0.183) 
 IEP  -0.026 0.014  0.766*** 0.809*** 
   (0.116) (0.115)  (0.115) (0.115) 
School year 2015/2016 
(2014/2015=ref.) 
 
1.467*** 1.449***  1.451*** 1.433*** 
  
 (0.050) (0.050)  (0.050) (0.050) 
Control variables 
included 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant -6.575*** -7.288*** -7.814*** -6.312*** -7.029*** -7.550*** 
    (0.060) (0.068) (0.123) (0.058) (0.066) (0.121) 
School variance 1.461*** 2.109*** 1.878*** 1.432*** 2.080*** 1.858*** 
  (0.137) (0.127) (0.121) (0.138) (0.125) (0.120) 
School year variance 3.885*** 2.606*** 2.615*** 3.942*** 2.549*** 2.557*** 
  (0.168) (0.120) (0.121) (0.171) (0.118) (0.118) 
N pupils 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 
N Schools 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 
N Schools*School year 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Models 3 and 6 are controlled for 
gender, migration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, 
household income, denomination and urbanization of school and school size; Results for the full model 




Across all models, we find that higher scores on the (recalculated) test advice are correlated 
with a greater likelihood that teacher adjust their advice. This means that pupils with a higher 
(recalculated) test advice are more likely to get an adjusted test advice. Additionally, we see 
that a lower initial teacher advice is correlated with lower chances of getting an adjusted 
teacher advice.  
As indicated, the effect of the different types of tests is best observed in models 5 and 
6. Controlled for the recalculated test advice, pupils who took the IEP-test have a much higher 
chance to receive an upward adjusted advice than the control group who took the CET-test 
(0.77 in the model 5 and 0.81 in the model 6). The opposite holds for pupils who took the 
Route 8-test: They have a lower chance to receive an upward advice (-0.62 and -0.58 
respectively).  This means that H1 is confirmed: The initial teacher advice of pupils who took 













Table 4. Multilevel logistic regression analysis of test advice and recalculated test advice on 
the adjustment of the teacher advice for different income groups 
    M6a M6b M6c 
    Low income Middle income High income 
Recalculated test advice 3.075*** 2.887*** 3.485*** 
  (0.0250) (0.036) (0.070) 
Initial teacher advice -2.869*** -2.801*** -3.473*** 
  (0.048) (0.033) (0.063) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)    
 Route 8 -0.380 -0.635** -0.894** 
  (0.247) (0.197) (0.277) 
 IEP 0.853*** 0.749*** 0.916*** 
  (0.147) (0.121) (0.163) 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) 1.448*** 1.363*** 1.251*** 
  (0.073) (0.055) (0.077) 
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -7.646*** -6.982*** -7.076*** 
  (0.183) (0.132) (0.203) 
School variance 1.583*** 1.437*** 1.657*** 
  (0.183) (0.126) (0.209) 
School year variance 2.651*** 2.151*** 2.371*** 
  (0.213) (0.136) (0.239) 
N pupils 71,875 139,814 72,738 
N Schools 5,441 5,505 5,227 
N Schools*School year 10,391 108,44 9,692 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Models are controlled for gender, 
migration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, denomination 
and urbanization of school and school size; Results for the full model available upon request. 
 
Does this conclusion also hold for the different income groups? In Table 4, we present the 
results of our preferred model with the recalculated test advice of Table 3 (Model 6), 
separately for pupils from low, middle, and high household incomes. For pupils who took the 
IEP-test, we find no differences across the three income levels: All groups profit equally from 
having taken the IEP-test. This means that H2 is refuted. For the Route 8-test, we note that 
the negative effect is only observed for pupils from the middle- and high-income families. This 
makes sense as these pupils are more often eligible for the highest academic track (VWO) for 
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which the Route 8-test less often advices (see Figure 2b). The opposite holds for the pupils 
from low-income families: They also suffer from the under-advising for the highest academic 
track, but this is ‘compensated’ by similar under-advising for the lowest track (VMBO b, see 
Figure 2b). The overall effect is therefore not significant.  
 
Relation between the Test Advice and the Educational Position after Three Years 
 
Table 5 presents the multilevel regression estimates of the relation between the test advice 
and the educational position after three years. Again, we show separate models for the test 
advice and the recalculated test advice. Across all models, we find that a higher score on the 
(recalculated) test advice as well as on the initial teacher advice correlates strongly with a 
higher educational position after three years.  
Regarding the test advice, we see in Model2 2 and 3 that the pupils who took the 
Route 8-test do not significantly differ from those who took the CET-test. Since we also added 
a school year variable, the comparison with the CET-test is in fact a comparison with the pupils 
who took the CET-test in 2014/2015. Pupils who took a Route 8-test do not have a higher 
educational position in secondary education after three years, compared to pupils in the 
previous cohort of the same schools who took the CET-test. When we look at the recalculated 
test advice models, we still do not observe a significant effect of having taken the Route 8-
test (vs. CET-test) on the educational position three years later.  
For the IEP-test however, we find a significant negative association: Pupils who took 
the IEP-test are less likely to end up with a high position in secondary education three years 
later, compared to the previous cohort of pupils in the same schools who took the CET-test 
(Models 2 and 3). The negative effect of -0.091 (Model 3) means that pupils who took this 
test dropped by one 10th of a school level once they reach the third year in secondary 
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education (grade 9). However, when looking at the recalculated test advice models, we can 
see that this is entirely due to the IEP-test track recommendations being systematically too 
high. If we control for this by using the recalculated advice, the negative effect is barely 
significant (Model 5) or not significant (Model 6). This means that there is no positive long-





















Table 5. Multilevel linear regression analysis of test advice and recalculated test advice on the 
educational position after three years 
    Test advice Recalculated test advice 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Test advice 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.269***       
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Recalculated test advice    0.273*** 0.274*** 0.267*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Initial teacher advice 0.628*** 0.626*** 0.617*** 0.626*** 0.625*** 0.616*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)       
 Route 8  0.021 0.022  -0.022 -0.020 
   (0.012) (0.011)  (0.012) (0.011) 
 IEP  -0.101*** -0.091***  -0.018* -0.010 
   (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
School year 2015/2016 
(2014/2015=ref.)  0.016*** 0.014***  0.016*** 0.014*** 
   (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Control variables included No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant 0.194*** 0.190*** 0.074*** 0.203*** 0.196*** 0.080*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
School variance 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
School year variance 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Residual variance 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.306*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.306*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N pupils 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 284,427 
N Schools 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 
N Schools*School year 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 10,946 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Models 3 and 6 are controlled for 
gender, migration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, 
household income, denomination and urbanization of school and school size; Results for the full model 
available upon request 
 
We now test whether these conclusions also hold for the different subgroups. In Table 6, we 
present the results of our preferred model with the recalculated test advice of Table 5 (Model 
6), separately for pupils with low, middle, and high household incomes. Basically, we find that 
the type of test has no effect at all for any income group, so we find no support for H3: There 
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are no long-term benefits from having taken the more lenient test for the pupils from the 
high-income groups.    
 
Table 6. Multilevel linear regression analysis of recalculated test advice on educational 
position after three years for different income groups 
    M6a M6b M6c 
  Low income Middle income High income 
Recalculated test advice 0.273*** 0.254*** 0.267*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Initial teacher advice 0.596*** 0.633*** 0.623*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)    
 Route 8 -0.020 -0.014 -0.015 
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) 
 IEP -0.017 0.002 0.004 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.093*** 0.151*** 0.253*** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
School variance 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
School year variance 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Residual variance 0.361*** 0.304*** 0.253*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
N pupils 71,875 139,814 72,738 
N Schools 5,441 5,505 5,227 
N Schools*School year 10,391 10,844 9,692 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Models are controlled for gender, 
migration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, denomination 





We ran several robustness checks to scrutinize our findings. First, we split our sample into 
two groups based on the test score and compare the pupils with above and below median 
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scores in 2014/2015 with those in 2015/2016 in the same schools (see Table A4 in Appendix 
2). We ran our preferred model for these two groups separately. Interestingly, we observe a 
negative effect for both IEP and Route 8-test for pupils with above median test scores. For 
pupils who took the Route 8-test, we find a negative effect of -0.038. This reflects the fact 
that for the above median pupils who took the Route 8, the stricter test more often denied 
them access to an appropriate track. Although the effect is not very substantial (about 1/26th  
of a school level difference), it is significant at the p=0.01 level. We also find a similar negative 
effect for pupils who took the more lenient IEP-test. This seems to suggest that for the above 
median pupils, having taken the lenient test might even have harmed their subsequent 
career, despite the initial positive effect on the teacher’s advice. In both cases however, the 
effect is not very substantial.  
Second, we split our sample into pupils who received a vmbo b, vmbo k, vmbo gt, havo 
or vwo test track recommendation, to observe whether the type of test had any effect for a 
specific range of test scores (corresponding to a certain test advice). Here we only use single 
recalculated test advices. The results are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix 2. Except for 
a HAVO-advice for Route 8, we find no long-term effects of the type of test for specific track 
recommendations on the educational position three years later.  
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
High-stakes tests are often used to allocate pupils to prestigious tracks or schools in secondary 
education or students to prestigious programs or colleges in tertiary education. It is not clear 
what would happen if the standards for such tests would be systematically lowered for one 
group or raised for another group. Would the former group profit from this? And if so, does 
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this last? And what about the detrimental effects for the group for whom the standards were 
raised?  
Theoretically one could expect positive outcomes for the group for whom the bar was 
lowered. Being signaled in the test as a ‘high performer’ (even if this not entirely true) might 
raise expectations and result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. And in the opposite case, being 
signaled as a ‘low performer’ on the test and being denied access to a track that is too low 
might result in motivational problems and dropout. We might also expect that these effects 
might differ between socio-economic groups. Parents and pupils from a high-SES background 
might find it easier to use the opportunities provided by lower standards or circumvent the 
obstacles of higher standards.  
Although these questions are highly relevant for policymakers to design admission 
policies, it is hard to get experimental evidence on the long-term consequences. Running an 
experiment with lowering the standards for some pupils but not for others would be 
considered unethical because of the potential huge implications for pupils’ careers. In this 
paper we use a unique natural experiment to assess how the standards of a high-stakes test 
at the end of primary education affect a pupil’s performance in secondary education. 
Traditionally, some 90% of the schools in the Netherlands used the same high-stakes test, 
namely, the CET-test. We employ a change in the law allowing two new suppliers of high-
stakes tests to enter the market: Route 8 and IEP. All three tests convert the test score in a 
so-called track recommendation. This track recommendation (referred to as test advice) plays 
an important role in the primary school teacher’s advice and the initial track placement in 
secondary education. We use the fact that, in the year of introduction, the new tests were 
not yet properly calibrated as they were developed and calibrated on a small sample of pupils 
in a low-stakes setting. This implied that the cut-off points for the different track 
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recommendations were too high in one case and too low in the other case. The IEP-test was 
systematically converting test scores in track recommendations that were too high, and the 
other new test, the Route 8-test, was giving track recommendations that were too low for the 
high-achieving group. It is important to note that schools had no prior knowledge on these 
characteristics of the test and therefore this cannot have played a role in the decision of the 
school to switch to one of the new test suppliers.   
We use high-quality register data from the NCO, covering some 285,000 pupils from 
over 5,500 primary schools. We use a within-schools-across-cohorts multilevel design to 
model the short- and long-term outcomes. Does the standard of the test affect the final 
teacher’s advice, and does it affect educational position three years later? And are these 
effects heterogeneous across pupils from different income groups?  
 We find that pupils who took the IEP-test initially profited from this by receiving a 
higher final teacher advice. However, after three years in secondary education, this did not 
result in a higher track. Instead, these pupils ended up in the same educational position as a 
control group taking the traditional test. The same holds for the Route 8-test, although the 
expectations for this test were different since the teachers could only upgrade and not 
downgrade their initial advice. This means that pupils who took the Route 8-test did not suffer 
from it, even though this test more often advised pupils to lower tracks than would have been 
the case if the pupils had taken the traditional test. However, we did find some indications 
that the pupils with above median test scores, did experience some negative effect from 
having taken the lenient (IEP) as well as the stricter test (Route 8). However, these effects 
sizes are quite small. We also conducted these analyses separately by social group but found 





What are the policy implications? First, we can interpret the results as showing that the Dutch 
educational system is able to correct for mistakes in the allocation process. Even though the 
IEP-test clearly led a large proportion of pupils to get a final teacher advice that is too high, 
this was compensated for or corrected in the first years of secondary education. In that sense, 
there is enough flexibility in the system to compensate for weak links in the allocation process 
chain. This is in line with a similar conclusion by Dustmann, Puhani & Schonberg (2017) for 
Germany, a country also known for its early stratification. They examine the long-term 
outcomes of misallocation in the transition from primary to secondary education in Germany 
and find no effects on wages, employment or occupation choice at later ages: “These findings 
emphasise a core aspect of the basis on which tracking systems should be assessed: the built-
in possibilities for correcting earlier allocations at a stage when more information is revealed 
about a student’s true potential.” (Dustmann et al., 2017: 1348). The results suggest that the 
Dutch education also has these built-in flexibilities, that allow earlier errors in the track 
placement to be corrected. This flexibility is an important but also overlooked feature that 
characterizes education systems (Wessling & Van der Velden, 2021).  
It is important to note that this is only possible, because schools in the Netherlands 
have the option of postponing the actual track decision by offering so-called bridging classes. 
In such schools, the actual tracking can be postponed to age 13 or even age 14. This means 
that any mistakes, either in test advice or final teacher advice, can be corrected in the first 
two years. In that sense, it is worrisome that in the past few years more and more schools are 
switching to homogeneous tracks as of the first year in secondary education (Inspectorate of 
Education, 2018) which has negative implications for providing opportunities to pupils to 
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reach their full potential, as well as a successful school career (Bles, Van der Velden, & Ariës, 
2020).  
The results also indicate that there is no easy solution to increase the enrollment of 
disadvantaged groups in secondary education. Affirmative action, such as giving low-SES 
children higher track recommendations will not automatically result in better educational 
careers if this track recommendation is not accompanied by extra support in secondary 
education (Baker & Johnston, 2010; Bodvin, Verschueren, De Haene, & Struyf, 2018).  
A final interesting conclusion is that the initial teacher’s advice is less sensitive to 
systematic errors than the test advices are. Looking at the results, we can conclude that the 
new IEP-test did lead to a change (upward adjustment) in teachers’ advice, but in this case 
the initial advice was better than the final advice.  
Possible limitations 
 
Ideally it would have been best to design an RCT to assess the effects of changes in the 
standards of a test on subsequent allocation. As indicated, such a design is unlikely to be 
approved by an ethical committee because of the potential negative consequences for pupils 
involved. In the absence of an RCT, we think that this natural experiment comes very close. 
The schools and the teachers had no prior knowledge that the standards of these tests were 
different. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the standards of the test played a role in 
the decision to switch to a new supplier. This is in line with the fact that some schools switched 
to a test that was more lenient while other schools switched to a test that was stricter. 
Still, it could be argued that schools self-select into new test suppliers. We address 
this by using a within-schools-across-cohorts multilevel design. This means that we compare 
cohorts within the same schools that got a different treatment. It is very unlikely that the 
compositions of pupil cohorts within a school changes over time.  
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Another issue that often plagues experimental research is selective panel mortality. 
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Appendix 1: Background information on the tests  
CET-test 
The CET-test entails three mornings/afternoons of two or three hours in which the pupils 
receive questions related to math and language.  Almost all the pupils take the CET-test on 
paper. The CET-test is not adaptive, but during the period we analyze, there were two versions 
of the test, the so-called N-test and B-test. The N-test is for pupils the teacher expects to 
follow theoretical pre-vocational tracks or higher (vmbo gt, in Dutch or higher). The B-test is 
for pupils the teacher expects would be most suited to the practical pre-vocational tracks 
(vmbo b or vmbo k, in Dutch). This decision is not meant to be a form of pre-selection but, 
rather, to make sure that all pupils are assessed as precisely as possible with a test that is 
neither too easy nor too difficult. Since both tests partly overlap (i.e., a quarter of the test 
items are the same), the results of the B-test can be transformed into track recommendations 
corresponding to the N-test so that all the track recommendations are comparable. 
 
Route 8-test 
The Route 8-test differs from the CET-test because it is an adaptive computer test, meaning 
that it responds to the quality of pupils’ answers. Pupils are given different difficulty-level 
dependent questions based on their performance, so that the questions match their ability.  
Furthermore, the test is a much shorter, encompassing only about two to three hours, 
whereas the CET-test takes about six to nine hours. 
 
IEP-test 
The IEP-test takes about four hours, spread over two mornings, and is therefore a shorter test 
than the CET-test.  Furthermore, just like the CET-test, the IEP-test is administered on paper. 
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Appendix 2: Background tables and figures 
Table A1. Descriptives of the total sample 
    N Mean SD Min Max 
Educational position after 3 years 284,427 2.419 1.231 0 4 
Test advice 284,427 2.495 1.291 0 4 
Recalculated test advice 284,427 2.485 1.303 0 4 
Initial teacher advice 284,427 2.424 1.214 0 4 
Adjusted teacher advice (No=Ref.) 284,427 0.054 0.225 0 1 
Final teacher advice 284,427 2.465 1.206 0 4 
Type of test (CET=ref.) 284,427 0.938 0.242 0 1 
 Route 8 284,427 0.020 0.140 0 1 
 IEP 284,427 0.043 0.202 0 1 
Gender Girls (Boys=ref.) 284,427 0.504 0.500 0 1 
Migration background (Non-migrant=ref.) 284,427 0.784 0.412 0 1 
 1st generation 284,427 0.020 0.140 0 1 
 2nd generation 284,427 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Father’s employment status (Employed=ref.) 284,427 0.863 0.344 0 1 
 Receives benefit 284,427 0.075 0.263 0 1 
 Inactive 284,427 0.016 0.126 0 1 
 Missing 284,427 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Mother’s employment status (Employed=ref.) 284,427 0.772 0.420 0 1 
 Receives benefit 284,427 0.107 0.309 0 1 
 Inactive 284,427 0.115 0.320 0 1 
 Missing 284,427 0.006 0.074 0 1 
Household structure 1 adult (2 adults=ref.) 284,427 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Household income (Low=ref.) 284,427 0.253 0.435 0 1 
 Middle 284,427 0.492 0.500 0 1 
 High 284,427 0.256 0.436 0 1 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) 284,427 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Denomination (Public schools=ref.) 284,427 0.305 0.460 0 1 
 Schools based on philosophies 284,427 0.046 0.209 0 1 
 Schools based on religious beliefs 284,427 0.648 0.477 0 1 
 Multi-denominational 284,427 0.001 0.029 0 1 
Urbanization (Very low=ref.) 284,427 0.103 0.304 0 1 
 Low 284,427 0.241 0.428 0 1 
 Medium 284,427 0.211 0.408 0 1 
 Strong 284,427 0.275 0.447 0 1 
 Very strong 284,427 0.169 0.375 0 1 





Table A2. Overview of categorisation of test scores into test advices 
 
CET-test Route 8-test IEP-test 
2014/2015   
501–518 vmbo b     
519–525 vmbo b/k     
526–528 vmbo k     
529–532 vmbo gt     
533–536 vmbo gt, havo     
537–539 havo     
540–544 havo / vwo     
545–550 vwo     
2015/2016 2015/2016 2015/2016 
501 – 518 vmbo b 141 - 168 vmbo b 50-61 vmbo b/k 
519 – 525 vmbo b/k 169 - 190 vmbo k 62-70 vmbo k/tl(gt) 
526 – 528 vmbo k 191 - 210 vmbo gt 71-76 vmbo gt 
529 – 532 vmbo gt 211 - 234 havo 77-81 vmbo gt/havo 
533 – 536 vmbo gt, havo >234 vwo 82-86 havo 
537 – 539 havo   87-92 havo/vwo 
540 – 544 havo / vwo   93-100 vwo 




Table A3. Crosstabulation of initial teacher advice and test advice in percentages 
    Initial teacher advice     








Vmbo bb 58.61 11.65 21.67 1.74 5.78 0.31 0.16 0.03 0.04 100 
Vmbo bb/kb 23.01 9.07 35.75 4.60 24.21 1.90 1.25 0.16 0.06 100 
Vmbo kb 8.18 5.40 30.58 5.49 40.30 5.01 4.58 0.28 0.18 100 
Vmbo kb/gt 15.67 8.33 34.17 6.57 28.59 3.67 2.75 0.15 0.08 100 
Vmbo gt 3.16 2.70 20.35 4.52 46.78 8.45 12.13 1.33 0.59 100 
Vmbo gt/havo 0.92 1.01 9.62 2.69 41.19 12.00 26.94 3.68 1.95 100 
Havo 0.27 0.35 3.31 1.21 25.30 11.01 41.83 8.74 8.00 100 
Havo/vwo 0.06 0.10 0.76 0.34 9.58 5.85 43.45 15.23 24.63 100 
Vwo 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 1.15 0.91 15.32 10.74 71.74 100 





Value Educational position after three years 
4 Vwo 9th grade Havo 10th grade 
 
   
3 Vwo 8th grade Havo 9th grade Vmbo gt 10th grade 
 
 
2 Vwo 7th grade Havo 8th grade Vmbo gt 9th grade Vmbo k 10th grade  
1   Havo 7th grade Vmbo gt 8th grade Vmbo k 9th grade Vmbo b 10th grade 
0     Vmbo gt 7th grade Vmbo k 8th grade Vmbo b 9th grade 






Table A4. Multilevel linear regression analyses of test advice on the educational position after 
3 years based on pupils with a percentile score below median vs. pupils with a median score or 
above 
    M6a M6b 
  Below median Median or above  
Recalculated test advice 0.226*** 0.298*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Initial teacher advice 0.595*** 0.627*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)   
 Route 8 -0.019 -0.038** 
  (0.015) (0.014) 
 IEP 0.009 -0.035*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) 0.026*** -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Control variables included Yes Yes 
Constant 0.146*** -0.037** 
  (0.010) (0.012) 
School variance 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
School year variance 0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Residual variance 0.318*** 0.287*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
N pupils 139,821 144,606 
N Schools 5,488 5,482 
N Schools*School year 10,149 10,744 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; All models are controlled for gender, 
immigration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, household income, 





Table A5. Multilevel linear regression analyses of test advice on the educational position 
after 3 years by different treatment groups based on single recalculated test advice 
    M6 M6 M6 M6 M6 
  vmbo b vmbo k vmbo gt havo vwo 
      
Initial teacher advice 0.597*** 0.601*** 0.573*** 0.618*** 0.588*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Type of test (CET=ref.)      
 Route 8 0.046 -0.010 -0.048 -0.060* -0.027 
  (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016) 
 IEP 0.011 0.021 0.020 -0.033 -0.007 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) 
School year 2015/2016 (2014/2015=ref.) -0.002 0.018* 0.027*** 0.032*** -0.001 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
Control variables included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.152*** 0.420*** 0.603*** 0.752*** 1.391*** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
School variance 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
School year variance 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Residual variance 0.237*** 0.312*** 0.319*** 0.358*** 0.182*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
N pupils 18,755 21,307 33,384 31,266 56,465 
N Schools 4,568 4,992 5,296 5,268 5,285 
N Schools*School year 7,127 8,323 9,517 9,351 9,696 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; All models are controlled for gender, 
immigration background, father’s and mother’s employment status, household structure, household income, 
denomination and urbanization of school and school size 
 
